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Abstract
Using an estimated DSGE model that features monetary and scal policy interac-
tions and allows for equilibrium indeterminacy, we nd that a passive monetary and
passive scal policy regime prevailed in the pre-Volcker period while an active monetary
and passive scal policy regime prevailed post-Volcker. Since both monetary and scal
policies were passive pre-Volcker, there was equilibrium indeterminacy that gave rise to
self-fullling beliefs and resulted in substantially di¤erent transmission mechanisms of
policy as compared to conventional models: unanticipated increases in interest rates in-
creased ination and output while unanticipated increases in lump-sum taxes decreased
ination and output. Unanticipated shifts in monetary and scal policies however, played
no substantial role in explaining the variation of ination and output at any horizon in
either of the time periods. Pre-Volcker, in sharp contrast to post-Volcker, we nd that
a time-varying ination target does not explain low-frequency movements in ination.
A combination of shocks account for the dynamics of output, ination, and government
debt, with the relative importance of a particular shock quite di¤erent in the two time-
periods due to changes in the systematic responses of policy. Finally, in a counterfactual
exercise, we show that had the monetary policy regime of the post-Volcker era been
in place pre-Volcker, ination volatility would have been lower by 34% and the rise of
ination in the 1970s would not have occurred.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models that are estimated and used for monetary policy analysis typically
abstract from non-trivial monetary and scal policy interactions. A theoretical literature
starting with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) has
however, long emphasized that monetary and scal policies jointly determine equilibrium
model dynamics. Moreover, the recent crisis which has brought to the fore issues of monetary
and scal policy interactions, due to unconventional monetary policy actions that can have
signicant e¤ects on the government budget and great uncertainty about the future course of
scal policy, provides an additional impetus to model monetary and scal policies jointly in
macroeconomic models geared towards policy analysis.
Motivated by these considerations, we extend a standard DSGE model that features nomi-
nal and real rigidities to include an explicitly specied description of scal policy. Similar to the
standard feedback rule for monetary policy that governs how nominal interest rates respond
to ination and output, our model features a feedback rule for scal policy that determines
how taxes respond to debt, output, and government spending.1 Moreover, the equilibrium
of the economy in our model has to be consistent with the intertemporal government budget
constraint.
In such a set-up, as shown by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and Woodford (1995), the
equilibrium model dynamics depend crucially on monetary and scal policy stances, that is,
the strength with which policies respond to the state of the economy. Equilibrium in our
model is determinate under two cases: either when both the interest rate response to ination
and the tax response to debt are strong (an active monetary and passive scal policy regime)
or when both the responses are weak (a passive monetary and active scal policy regime).
Indeterminacy of equilibrium arises when a weak interest rate response to ination is coupled
with a strong response of taxes to debt (a passive monetary and passive scal policy regime).2
We use this model as a laboratory to answer four broad set of questions. First, what
monetary and scal policy regimes characterized post-War U.S. data? Second, what were the
monetary and scal policy transmission mechanisms over time? Third, which shocks were the
primary sources of short and long-run variation in output, ination, and government debt?
Fourth, what would have been the path of ination, especially with regards to the rise of
ination in the 1970s; under a (counterfactual) monetary policy regime di¤erent from the
estimated one?
1We consider lump-sum taxes and transfers, one-period riskless nominal debt, and exogenous government
spending for simplicity in the basic model.
2We use the language of Leeper (1991) in characterizing policies as active or passive. The exact bounds
for active and passive policies are model-specic and we make these denitions precise later in the paper after
introducing the model.
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We conduct our empirical analysis, following the literature, by splitting the data into two
time-periods based on the timing of Paul Volckers chairmanship at the Federal Reserve: a
pre-Volcker period and a post-Volcker period.3 Using likelihood based methods, we t our
model to data on nominal, real, and scal variables. In particular, we use the likelihood based
estimation method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) that allows for indeterminacy in
a DSGE model.4 Allowing for the possibility of indeterminacy in an estimated DSGE model
that features monetary and scal policy interactions is a distinct contribution of our paper, and
one that matters signicantly for our results.5 Using a Bayesian model comparison exercise,
we rst assess the best-tting policy regime in the two time-periods. With the posterior
distribution of the parameters of the best-tting model at hand, we then conduct several
impulse response, variance decomposition, and counterfactual analyses.
Our main results are as follows.6 First, using Bayesian model comparison we nd that pre-
Volcker, the best-tting model is a passive monetary and passive scal policy regime while
post-Volcker, it is an active monetary and passive scal policy regime. Thus, our results are
consistent with those of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), who using univariate methods,
provide evidence for a weak response of interest rates to expected ination in the pre-Volcker
period. In a DSGE context, our results are also consistent with those in Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004). As we discuss below however, our results on the transmission mechanisms of monetary
and scal policies in the pre-Volcker period are in sharp contrast to the literature.
Second, using impulse response analysis we show that the transmission mechanisms of
monetary and scal policies were substantially di¤erent in the two time periods. In partic-
ular, since both monetary and scal policies were passive pre-Volcker, there was equilibrium
indeterminacy that substantially altered the propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks
in the economy due to self-fullling beliefs of the agents. For example, while pre-Volcker, an
unanticipated increase in interest rates led to an increase in output and ination, post-Volcker,
it led to a decline in output and ination. Moreover, while pre-Volcker, an unanticipated in-
crease in the (lump-sum) tax revenues-to-output ratio led to a decline in output and ination,
post-Volcker, it had no e¤ects on output or ination.
Pre-Volcker, the response of the economy to unanticipated policy shifts was thus similar
3Following the literature, we dene the pre-Volcker sample from 1960:Q1 to 1979:Q2 and a post-Volcker
sample from 1982:Q4 onwards.
4Briey, this method which we discuss in detail later, indexes the multiples solutions under indeterminacy
using additional parameters and then using a Bayesian inference procedure constructs, conditional on the
observed data, probability weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy regions of the parameter space.
5Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) assess the role of equilibrium indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy
but abstract from scal policy while Traum and Yang (2011) tackle monetary and scal policy interactions
but abstract from the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. Bianchi and Ilut (2012) estimate a model with
a one-time unanticipated change from an active scal to passive scal regime and use it to explain the rise of
ination in the 1970s; while also abstracting from equilibrium indeterminacy.
6Some preliminary and partial results of this research appear in Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012).
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to that predicted by the scal theory of the price level (FTPL).7 Under FTPL, an increase
in interest payments due to a contractionary monetary policy increases spending by agents
because of a positive wealth e¤ect. This then leads to an increase in ination and output.
Moreover, shifts in scal policy inuence ination and output under FTPL due to wealth
e¤ects. In contrast, post-Volcker, the response of the economy followed the predictions of
standard models of price determination.
Our ndings in an estimated DSGE model that pre-Volcker, ination increased both on
impact and afterwards following a monetary contraction and unanticipated movements in
lump-sum taxes a¤ected both ination and output is new to the literature. For example, Lu-
bik and Schorfheide (2004), who only model monetary policy, nd that in their indeterminate
model in the pre-Volcker period, ination does not rise on impact following an interest rate
increase. Our results are in fact quite close to those obtained from the identied VAR litera-
ture. Since the work of Sims (1992), it has been observed that in many VAR specications,
ination tends to increase on impact following a contractionary monetary policy shock. This
has been dubbed the "price puzzle" in the literature since it goes against the predictions of the
standard models of price determination. Hanson (2004) in a comprehensive study showed that
this "price puzzle" seems to be a feature only of the pre-Volcker period and not for the entire
post-War U.S. data. Our results are thus consistent with his ndings and moreover, provide a
model based interpretation. In addition, Sims (2011) provides some VAR based evidence on
predictory power of scal variables in explaining U.S. ination. We provide complementary
evidence from our estimated model on this front, albeit only for the pre-Volcker period.
Third, using variance decomposition analysis we nd that in both the time-periods and
at both the short and long-run, unanticipated shifts in monetary and scal policies play only
a minor role in explaining the dynamics of ination and output.8 For example, for ination,
pre-Volcker, monetary and scal policy shocks explain less than 10% of the variation at both
horizons. Post-Volcker, both the shocks explain basically no variation at either horizons. For
output growth, pre-Volcker, monetary policy shocks explain around 1:6% and scal policy
shocks explain around 6:0% of the variation in both the short and long-run. Post-Volcker,
the monetary shock explains around 2:5% of the variation at both horizons while scal policy
shocks explain basically no variation in output growth.
Our result that random variations in monetary policy do not explain much of the uctua-
tions in the data is consistent with the results in the identied VAR literature, for example,
7Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011) is a recent survey of the FTPL literature. In our model, FTPL is
operative under a passive monetary and active scal policy regime. We nd that our estimated best-tting
model pre-Volcker, a passive monetary and passive scal policy regime, mimics a passive monetary and active
scal policy regime in important dimensions, even though it is not technically one where the FTPL has to be
operative for sure.
8We focus on a 4 and 40 quarter horizon in our variance decomposition results.
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Sims and Zha (2006a). That the same conclusion also holds for random variations in scal
policy, given by unanticipated movements in taxes, is completely new to the literature. While
we nd that random disturbances to policy do not matter, this does not imply at all that
the systematic component to policy is also irrelevant. In fact, to the contrary, as we discuss
below next, the propagation mechanisms of many shocks are substantially di¤erent in the two
time-periods. This is exactly because the systematic responses of policy were dramatically
di¤erent pre and post-Volcker, with di¤erent monetary and scal policy regimes operative in
the two time-periods.
We also want to emphasize a similar point for indeterminacy. For the pre-Volcker period,
sunspot shocks introduced due to indeterminacy play a minor role in explaining the dynamics
of ination and output: they are irrelevant for ination dynamics and explain only around 11%
of the variation at both horizons for output growth. While we thus nd that sunspot shocks do
not matter quantitatively, this does not necessarily imply that indeterminacy is not signicant
for explaining macroeconomic dynamics in the pre-Volcker period. In fact, indeterminacy due
to passive monetary and scal policy leads to fundamentally di¤erent propagation mechanism
of fundamental shocks, as agentsself-fullling beliefs play a key role in model dynamics.
Fourth, pre-Volcker, in sharp contrast to post-Volcker, we nd that variations in the in-
ation target do not explain low-frequency movements in ination. In the recent DSGE lit-
erature, a consensus nding has emerged that the long-run variation in ination is explained
mostly by shocks to the ination target in the monetary reaction function. For example,
Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) show that both pre- and post-Volcker, smoothed ina-
tion target shock tracks actual ination remarkably well. While we nd a similar result in
the post-Volcker period, our results are quite di¤erent in the pre-Volcker era: ination target
shock explains virtually none of the long-run variation in ination. The major reason for this
di¤erence is that we explicitly allow for the possibility of indeterminacy while estimating our
model that features both monetary and scal policies. When the operative regime is active
monetary and passive scal policy, as is the implicit assumption in Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2010) for both the time-periods, then changes in the ination target do explain ina-
tion in the long-run since monetary policy fully controls ination dynamics. Our best-tting
estimated model in the pre-Volcker features indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy,
however. In this case, consider a decrease in the ination target. This, through the central
bank reaction function, does tend to increase the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate
in this model though, as we pointed out above, tends to increase ination. Thus, ination
target movements do not track actual ination in the long-run.
Fifth, we nd that the primary sources of short and long-run variation in ination, output,
and government debt are di¤erent in the two time periods as the propagation mechanisms of
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various shocks varies because of changes in policy stances. As mentioned above, post-Volcker,
low frequency movement in ination is explained by changes in the ination target. The high
frequency movement is mostly explained by mark-up shocks, which is also a standard result in
the literature. In the pre-Volcker period, in contrast, the role of mark-up shocks gets reduced
in the short-run while that of technology and demand shocks increases. Moreover, demand
and technology shocks also explain much of the variation in the long-run along with a non-
trivial role for mark-up shocks. In particular, since monetary policy regime was passive in the
pre-Volcker period, demand shocks that would typically be stabilized under active monetary
policy end up inuencing ination dynamics signicantly.
For output growth, in both periods, a combination of shocks explain variation at the two
horizons, but the importance of a particular shock is quite di¤erent. For example, while pre-
Volcker markup shocks are the most important source of variation in output growth (around
33%) at both horizons, post-Volcker, they account for no variation at either horizon. Thus,
in the post-Volcker period, markup shocks, which lead to a trade-o¤ between ination and
output stabilization under active monetary policy, a¤ected ination pre-dominantly without
a¤ecting output. Government spending, technology, and demand shocks are important in
both the time periods, although the role of demand shocks is much higher in the post-Volcker
period.
For the crucial scal variable, debt-to-output ratio, in both the time-periods, the short-
run variation is explained mostly by the transfer shock. In the long-run, a combination of
shocks are important, but the relative contribution of these shocks across the two periods
are again quite di¤erent. The policy regimes in place matter critically for the results as they
lead to a di¤erent role for shocks in explaining ination movements. For example, demand,
technology, and mark-up shocks are important drivers of long-run variation in debt-to-output
in the pre-Volcker period while shocks to the ination target play a non-trivial role in the post-
Volcker period. This di¤erence arises because as mentioned above, these shocks are important
drivers of long-run ination dynamics in the respective time periods, which plays a role in
debt stabilization.
Our goal of addressing the sources of variation in macroeconomic variables at di¤erent
horizons in a framework that allows for multiple shocks is similar to that of several VAR
studies, such as Shapiro and Watson (1988), and several DSGE-based studies, such as Smets
and Wouters (2007). One of our main contributions to this literature is to analyze these issues
by tting a DSGE model to data on both conventional variables such as output, ination, and
interest rates as well as scal variables such as taxes, spending, and debt.
Sixth, in a counterfactual exercise, we show that had the monetary policy regime of the
post-Volcker era been in place pre-Volcker, ination volatility would have been signicantly
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lower: the predicted standard deviation of ination is 1:795% compared to the actual value of
2:722%. Moreover, the steep rise of ination in the 1970s would not have occurred. Therefore,
a di¤erent systematic response of monetary policy to ination would have signicantly altered
ination dynamics in the pre-Volcker period.
2 Model
Our model is based on the prototypical New Keynesian set-up in Woodford (2003). While
we consider a relatively small-scale model, we make certain extensions to the basic textbook
set-up that are crucial for the issues that our paper intends to address.
We include external habit formation in consumption, partial dynamic indexation in price
setting, and a time-varying ination target in the monetary policy rule, following the recent
DSGE literature (Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2010), and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)). We add these features because
not only do they generate inertia and help capture low-frequency movements of the data, but
also as emphasized by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), they help avoid biasing our conclusion
towards indeterminacy since the model can generate fairly rich dynamics. Introducing time-
varying ination target in our framework has an additional important benet as it allows us to
disentangle better two competing hypotheses on the rise in ination in the pre-Volcker period:
raised ination target (Sargent (1999) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010)) as opposed
to changes in propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks or sunspot uctuations due to
indeterminacy (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)).
We add to this set-up a complete description of scal policy. The government in our
model issues one-period nominal risk-less bonds and levies lump-sum taxes to nance interest
payments and exogenous streams of spending and lump-sum transfers. Similar to monetary
policy, we posit an endogenous feedback rule for taxes.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households in the unit interval. Each household specializes in the
supply of a particular type of labor. A household that supplies labor of type-j maximizes the
utility function:
E0
( 1X
t=0
tt
"
log
 
Cjt   Ct 1
   Hjt 1+'
1 + '
#)
;
where Hjt denotes the hours of type-j labor services, Ct is aggregate consumption, and C
j
t
is consumption of household j. The parameters ; '; and  are, respectively, the discount
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factor, the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply, and the degree of external habit
formation, while t represents an intertemporal preference shock that follows:
t = 

t 1 exp(";t),
where ";t  i.i.d. N (0; 2 ).
Household js ow budget constraint is:
PtC
j
t +B
j
t + Et

Qt;t+1V
j
t+1

= Wt(j)H
j
t + V
j
t +Rt 1B
j
t 1 + t + St   Tt;
where Pt is the price level, B
j
t is the amount of one-period risk-less nominal government bond
held by household j, Rt is the interest rate on the bond, Wt(j) is the competitive nominal
wage rate for type-j labor, t denotes prots of intermediate rms, and (St   Tt) denotes
government transfers net of taxes.9 In addition to the government bond, households trade
at time t one-period state-contingent nominal securities V jt+1at price Qt;t+1, and hence fully
insure against idiosyncratic risk.
2.2 Firms
The nal good Yt, which is consumed by the government and households, is produced by
perfectly competitive rms assembling intermediate goods, Yt(i), with a Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) production technology Yt =
R 1
0
Yt(i)
t 1
t di
 t
t 1 , where t denotes time-varying elas-
ticity of substitution between intermediate goods that follows t = 1 

t 1 exp(";t).
10 The
corresponding price index for the nal consumption good is Pt =
R 1
0
Pt(i)
1 tdi
 1
1 t , where
Pt(i) is the price of the intermediate good i. The optimal demand for Yt(i) is given by
Yt(i) = (Pt(i)=Pt)
 t Yt.
Monopolistically competitive rms produce intermediate goods using the production func-
tion:
Yt(i) = AtHt(i);
where Ht(i) denotes the hours of type-i labor employed by rm i and At represents exogenous
economy-wide technological progress. The gross growth rate of technology at  At=At 1
follows:
at = a
1 aaat 1 exp("a;t);
where a is the steady-state value of at and "a;t  i.i.d. N (0; 2a).
9The budget constraint reects our assumptions that each household owns an equal share of all intermediate
rms and receives the same amount of net lump-sum transfers from the government.
10  is the steady-state value of t:
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As in Calvo (1983), a rm resets its price optimally with probability 1    every pe-
riod. Firms that do not optimize adjust their price according to the simple partial dynamic
indexation rule:
Pt(i) = Pt 1(i)

t 1
1 ;
where  measures the extent of indexation and  is the steady-state value of the gross ination
rate t  Pt=Pt 1. All optimizing rms choose a common price P t to maximize the present
discounted value of future prots:
Et
1X
k=0
kQt;t+k

P t Xt;k  
Wt+k(i)
At+k

Yt+k(i);
where
Xt;k 
(
(tt+1    t+k 1) (1 )k; k  1
1; k = 0
:
2.3 Government
2.3.1 Budget constraint
Each period, the government collects lump-sum tax revenues Tt and issues one-period nom-
inal bonds Bt to nance its consumption Gt, lump-sum transfer payments St, and interest
payments.11 Accordingly, the ow budget constraint is given by:
Bt
Pt
= Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+Gt   (Tt   St) ;
which can be rewritten by expressing scal variables as ratios to output:
bt = Rt 1bt 1
1
t
Yt 1
Yt
+ gt   t + st;
where bt = Bt=PtYt, gt = Gt=Yt, t = Tt=Yt, and st = St=Yt.
Government spending and transfers follow exogenous processes given by:
gt = (1  g) g + ggt 1 + "g;t;
st = (1  s) s+ sst 1 + "s;t;
where g and s are the steady-state values of gt and st respectively, "g;t  i.i.d. N
 
0; 2g

; and
11It might be worthwhile to relax the restriction of one-period governemnt bonds by allowing for long term
debt as in Cochrane (2001). This will reduce ination volatility under a passive monetary and active scal
policy regime.
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"s;t  i.i.d. N (0; 2s) :
2.3.2 Monetary policy
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R " t
t
  Yt
Y t
Y #1 R
exp ("R;t) ; (1)
which features interest rate smoothing and systematic responses to deviation of output from
its natural level Y t and deviation of ination from a time-varying target 

t .
12 R is the
steady-state value of Rt and the non-systematic monetary policy shock "R;t is assumed to
follow i.i.d. N (0; 2R). The ination target evolves exogenously as:
t = 
1   t 1 exp(";t);
where ";t  i.i.d. N (0; 2).
2.3.3 Fiscal policy
We assume a parsimonious scal policy rule that somewhat resembles the interest rate rule
(1).13 The scal authority sets the tax revenues-to-output ratio according to the scal rule:
t

=
t 1

 "bt 1
bt 1
 ~ b  Yt
Y t
 ~ Y gt
g
 ~ g#1 
exp (~";t) ;
which features tax smoothing and systematic responses to deviation of lagged debt-to-output
ratio from a time varying target bt 1, deviation of output from its natural level, and deviation
of government spending-to-output ratio from its steady state level.  is the steady-state value
of t and the non-systematic scal policy shock ~";t is assumed to follow i.i.d. N (0; ~2 ).
Similarly to the ination target, the debt-to-output ratio target evolves exogenously as:
bt = (1  b)b+ bbt 1 + "b;t;
where b is the steady-state value of bt and "b;t  i.i.d. N (0; 2b ).
12The natural level of output is the output that would prevail under exible prices and in the absence of
the shocks t:
13The specication is similar to that in Davig and Leeper (2011).
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2.4 Equilibrium, policy regimes, and determinacy
Equilibrium is characterized by the prices and quantities that satisfy the households and
rmsoptimality conditions, the government budget constraint, monetary and scal policy
rules, and the clearing conditions for the product, labor, and asset markets:Z 1
0
Cjt dj +Gt = Yt;
Ht(j) = H
j
t ;Z 1
0
V jt dj=0;Z 1
0
Bjt dj=Bt:
Note that Cjt = Ct due to the complete market assumption. The details of the optimality
conditions and the equilibrium are provided in the Appendix.
We use approximation methods to solve for equilibrium: we detrend variables on the
balanced growth path by normalizing by At and obtain a rst-order approximation to the
equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state.14 The linearized equations
are standard and are provided in the Appendix. Here we describe the linearized policy rules
and the government budget constraint to facilitate our discussion of determinacy and policy
regimes:
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)

 (^t   ^t ) + Y
b~Y t   b~Y t+ "R;t;
^t =  ^t 1 + (1   )

 b

b^t 1   b^t 1

+  Y
b~Y t   b~Y t+  gg^t+ ";t;
b^t =
1

b^t 1 +
b


R^t 1   ^t   b~Y t + b~Y t 1   a^t+ g^t   ^t + s^t:
The equilibrium of the economy will be determinate either if monetary policy is active while
scal policy is passive (the AMPF regime) or if monetary policy is passive while scal policy
is active (the PMAF regime). Multiple equilibria exist if both monetary and scal policies are
passive (the PMPF regime). In our model, monetary policy is active if  > 1  Y

1 ~
~

;
where ~ = +
1+
and ~ = (1 )(1 )
(1+')(1+)
(1 + ') ; and scal policy is active if  b < 1   1:15
14We denote variable XtAt by
~Xt. We dene the log deviation of a variable Xt from its steady state X as
X^t = lnXt   ln X, except for the four scal variables: b^t = bt   b, g^t = gt   g; ^t = t    , and s^t = st   s.
15Note here that as shown in the Appendix, the relationships between the feedback parameters of the
non-linear and linearized scal policy rules are given by:  b  b ~ b;  Y   ~ Y , and  g  g ~ g.
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Method
The system of linearized equations is solved for its state space representation. The solu-
tion method for linear rational expectations models of Sims (2002) is applied under determi-
nacy. Under indeterminacy, we employ a generalization of this method proposed in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) which expresses the solution of the model as:
zt= 

1 () zt 1+

 0;" () +  

0; ()M
	
"t+ 

0; () t; (2)
where zt is a vector of model variables, "t is a vector of fundamental shocks, and t is a vector
of sunspot shocks. The coe¢ cient matrices  1 (),  

0;" () ; and  

0; () are functions of the
structural model parameters.16 The matrix  0; () = 0 under determinacy, but is not zero in
general under indeterminacy. Thus indeterminacy introduces additional parameters, given by
the matrix M in (2), and a sunspot shock.17
With a distributional assumption on t (and "t), one can construct the likelihood of the
solution of the model using the Kalman lter. We use conventional Bayesian methods widely
used in the DSGE literature to t the model to the data. Since it is di¢ cult to characterize
analytically the posterior distribution of the structural parameters, we use a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo simulation. We rst nd a mode of the posterior density numerically using
csminwel by Christopher A. Sims. Then we use a random-walk Metropolis algorithm to draw
a sample from the posterior distribution. The proposal density of the random-walk Metropolis
algorithm is a Normal distribution whose mean is the previous successful draw and variance
is the inverse of the negative Hessian at the posterior mode found before the simulation. The
variance of the proposal density is scaled to achieve an acceptance rate of around 30%. For
details of the random-walk Metropolis algorithm, see An and Schorfheide (2007). For model
comparison purposes, marginal likelihoods are estimated using the modied harmonic mean
estimator by Geweke (1999).
3.2 Data
We use six key quarterly U.S. data as observables: per-capita output growth, annualized ina-
tion, annualized federal funds rate, tax revenues-to-output ratio, market value of government
debt-to-output ratio, and government spending-to-output ratio. A detailed description of the
data is in the Appendix. To make our results comparable to those of Lubik and Schorfheide
16 is a vector of model parameters.
17Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the solution method.
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(2004), we estimate the model over two samples: a pre-Volcker sample from 1960:Q1 to
1979:Q2 and a post-Volcker sample from 1982:Q4 to 2008:Q2. In particular, we drop the
Volcker disination period.
The corresponding measurement equations are given by:
100 log(Real per capita output) = b~Y t   b~Y t 1 + a^t + a
Annualized ination (%) = 4^t + 4
Annualized interest rates (%) = 4R^t + 4 (a+  + )
Nominal tax revenue
Nominal output
(%) = ^t + 100
Nominal government debt
Nominal output
(%) = b^t + 100b
Nominal government purchases
Nominal output
(%) = g^t + 100g
where a  100(a  1),   100(   1); and   100( 1   1).
3.3 Prior distributions
We calibrate ' = 1 and  = 8:18 We also calibrate  and b to 0:995 to restrict the role
for time-varying policy targets to that of explaining low frequency behavior of the data only.
For all the other parameters that we estimate, the priors we use are in Table 1. For the mean
value of observables and the technology growth rate, we use sample specic priors. We use
the same priors across the two sample periods for all other parameters. Most of the priors
that we use are standard in the literature. We discuss in detail two sets of priors that are
unique to our analysis.
The rst are those related to the policy rules. We impose each policy regime by repara-
meterizing two key policy parameters in the monetary and scal rules:  and  b. Denote
the boundaries for active and passive policies by M ()  1   Y

1 ~
~

and F () 
1

  1 respectively. Then let:
 = 
M () + ;  b = 
F () +  b ;
 = 
M ()  ;  b = F ()   b ;
 = 
M ()  ;  b = F () +  b ;
for the AMPF, PMAF, and PMPF regimes respectively.
18  and ' are not seperately identied from :
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The newly introduced parameters,  and  

b , are assumed positive by specifying a gamma
prior distribution with means 0:5 and 0:05 and standard deviations 0:2 and 0:04, respectively.
This reparametarization thus ensures that we completely impose a particular policy regime
during estimation. The implied 90% prior probability interval for  is (1:189; 1:811) under
AM and (0:185; 0:811) under PM while for  b it is (0:003; 0:107) under PF and ( 0:102; 0:003)
under AF (see Table 2).19
The second are those related to the case of indeterminacy. As mentioned above, indetermi-
nacy introduces additional parameters, given by the matrixM in (2). We try a few alternative
specications for the priors of those parameters. In the rst specication, we follow Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and set the prior mean of the additional parameters in M so that the im-
pact impulse responses of endogenous variables to fundamental shocks are as close as possible
across the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region. Our DSGE model
however, exhibits very di¤erent dynamics under determinacy and indeterminacy because of
the monetary and scal policy interactions. We thus do not nd it very appealing to re-
quire that the DSGE model have similar dynamics across the determinacy and indeterminacy
boundary. In the second specication, we therefore set the prior mean of M to zero. Since
 0;" () and  

0; () in (2) are orthogonal, this specication implies that the initial impact of
fundamental shocks is orthogonal to that of sunspot shocks at the prior mean. In addition,
we employ a quite di¤use prior for M to check the sensitivity of our results. In the remainder
of this paper, we report the results based on the second specication. Our results however,
are completely robust across the di¤erent specications.
3.4 Model comparison
We use marginal likelihoods across di¤erent policy regime specications to compare model t.
As Table 3 shows, the data favors the PMPF regime pre-Volcker, which implies indeterminacy,
and the AMPF regime post-Volcker.20 In this regard, our nding is in line with Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004). As we will show below however, the propagation mechanism under our
PMPF regime is substantively di¤erent from that under indeterminacy in their paper. This
underscores the importance of a complete specication of monetary and scal policies and the
inclusion of scal variables in model estimation.
19These intervals cover the range of values found in the literature, for example, Davig and Leeper (2011).
Note that we restrict the parameter space of  so that  is always positive.
20Note that if we had restricted the estimation to determinacy, then PMAF ts the data better than AMPF
pre-Volcker. This result is in contrast with that of Traum and Yang (2011), who use a di¤erent model and
data. In future, it will be interesting to fully explore the main reasons for this di¤erence.
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3.5 Posterior estimates
In Table 4 we present the posterior estimates of the best tting models for the two sample
periods: PMPF for pre-Volcker and AMPF for post-Volcker. As to be expected, the esti-
mates of some key policy parameters are di¤erent: the implied estimate of the posterior mean
for  is 0:188 pre-Volcker and 1:299 post-Volcker while for  b it is 0:094 pre-Volcker and
0:091 post-Volcker. The 90 % posterior probability interval for  is (0; 0:354) pre-Volcker
and (0:922; 1:680) post-Volcker while for  b it is (0:040; 0:146) pre-Volcker and (0:024; 0:168)
post-Volcker.
In addition to the feedback parameters, we also nd that the volatility of the two shocks
in the monetary policy rule, ";t and "R;t, changed signicantly across the sample periods.
The standard deviation of the shock to the ination target dropped from 0:060 to 0:037 while
the volatility of the monetary policy shock fell from 0:167 to 0:108. This nding is in line
with that of Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010), even though our policy regime in the
pre-Volcker period is di¤erent from theirs and unlike them, we include scal variables in our
estimation. In contrast to shocks in the monetary policy reaction function, there was no
substantial change in the volatility of the two shocks in the scal policy rule, "b;t and ";t,
after the Volcker disination.
With respect to the structural model parameters, we nd that the degree of price stickiness
increased in the post-Volcker period compared to the pre-Volcker period, while the degree of
price indexation declined. These ndings are consistent with results from a similar subsample
estimation exercise in Smets and Wouters (2007). We thus again show that these results
of the literature are robust to the inclusion of a completely specied scal rule as well as
scal variables in model estimation. In addition, the degree of habit formation  is lower
pre-Volcker than post-Volcker, which again conrms the nding of previous studies such as
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010). Our estimate in the
pre-Volcker period, 0:217, however, is smaller than those obtained in the previous studies
because under PMPF, the model can generate fairly persistent dynamics relative to under
AMPF without requiring a high level of habit formation.21
In terms of exogenous processes not related to the policy reaction functions, the standard
deviation of most shocks decreased in the post-Volcker compared to the pre-Volcker period.
For example, the standard deviation of the cost-push shock u^t declined by a quantitatively
important amount, which probably reects less signicant oil price shocks in the post-Volcker
period.22 The only exception to this is the demand shock d^t which became more volatile in
21When we imposed AMPF pre-Volcker, the esimate of  is 0.750 and not signicantly di¤erent from the
estimate in the post-Volcker period.
22Similar to Smets and Wouters (2007), we normalized some shocks. Specically, we estimated d^t 
(1  ) ^t and u^t    (1 )(1 )(1+')(1+) 1 1 ^t. See the Appendix for the model equations used in our estimation.
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the post-Volcker period. In terms of the persistence parameter, while it decreased for most
shocks, it increased quite a bit for the technology shock a^t and increased marginally for the
government spending shock g^t.
3.6 Propagation of shocks
3.6.1 Transmission mechanism of policy
In Figures 1  4 we present impulse responses to monetary and scal policy shocks in the two
sample periods. Our main nding is that for the best tting models, PMPF pre-Volcker and
AMPF post-Volcker, the monetary and scal policy transmission mechanisms are substantially
di¤erent. In particular, we nd that the monetary and scal policy transmission mechanisms
in our estimated PMPF model in the pre-Volcker era are similar to those that would prevail
under PMAF in many important dimensions.
For the best tting model pre-Volcker, as shown in Figure 1; a monetary contraction (i.e.
an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate) leads to an increase, not a decrease,
in output and ination. This result is in line with the prediction of the FTPL, which under
determinacy would be operative under PMAF. FTPL predicts an increase in spending follow-
ing an interest rate increase due to a positive wealth e¤ect, which then increases output and
ination, as shown in Figure 1. Thus our results provide a model based interpretation to the
"price puzzle" of the identied VAR literature: the tendency of ination to increase on impact
following a contractionary monetary policy shock. Hanson (2004) in a comprehensive study
showed that this "price puzzle" seems to be a feature only of the pre-Volcker period and not
for the entire post-War U.S. data, which is consistent with our results.
In addition, pre-Volcker, the impulse responses to various scal shocks resemble those
predicted by the FTPL. For example, an exogenous increase in the lump-sum tax-to-output
ratio produces a recession, decreasing output and ination as shown in Figure 3, an event
one would not observe under conventional AMPF. The interest rate decreases as well, only
weakly responding to lower ination due to passive monetary policy. This is indeed the
prediction of the FTPL: an increase in taxes leads to a negative wealth e¤ect, which decreases
spending and thereby ination and output. This is shown clearly in Figure 3: We thus nd
that our estimated best-tting model pre-Volcker, a PMPF regime, mimics a PMAF regime
in important dimensions, even though it is not technically one where the FTPL has to be
operative for sure.23
While the pre-Volcker U.S. economy was characterized by PMPF, it was under a AMPF
regime post-Volcker. Accordingly, and unlike the pre-Volcker era, the impulse responses are in
23Note that although the PMPF regime mimics the PMAF regime in the aforementioned dimensions, it is
di¤erent in other dimensions and thus is well identied
16
line with the predictions of standard monetary models: Figure 2 shows that an unanticipated
increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease, not an increase, in ination. In
addition, as Figure 4 makes clear, exogenous adjustments in tax revenues do not a¤ect output,
ination, and the interest rate, a conventional Ricardianequivalence result.
Moreover, Figures 2 and 4 show that post-Volcker, the PMPF model also produces quite
similar dynamics to AMPF. For example, as shown in Figure 2, the impulse responses to a
monetary contraction are quite similar between the two regimes, although the error bands are
much wider under PMPF. Similarly, Figure 4 illustrates that the two regimes have similar
predictions also for the propagation of scal shocks, since an unanticipated increase in tax-
to-output ratio has no meaningful impacts on output, ination and the interest rate while
reducing debt-to-output ratio under both the regimes. While the dynamics are similar, since
the PMPF regime involves many more estimated parameters, it is not favored over the AMPF
regime in our Bayesian model comparison.
We emphasize that our results for the pre-Volcker period are thus data-driven, and not
hard-wired into our model specication and estimation. Depending on how agents form beliefs,
as shown above, the model under PMPF can generate a wide range of dynamics, including
those that resemble the outcomes under AMPF or PMAF or neither. By characterizing the full
set of indeterminate beliefs with the additional parameters in M and the sunspot shocks, we
construct the distribution of the agents beliefs conditional on the data. In doing so, we nd,
for example, that the pre-Volcker data favors the agentsbeliefs that ination would increase
on impact (and afterwards) in response to monetary contractions. Under PMPF post-Volcker
however, our estimates imply that the agents did not believe that ination would increase in
response to interest rate increases. Similarly, the pre-Volcker data favors the agentsbeliefs
that ination would decrease on impact (and afterwards) in response to scal contractions.
Under PMPF post-Volcker however, our estimates imply that the agents believed that ination
would increase in response to lump-sum tax increases on average. However, since the error
band is quite wide and covers zero, the e¤ect is not signicant.
To make these mechanisms even more transparent, in Figure 5; we decompose the impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks under PMPF in the two time periods into two compo-
nents as given by (2): the part due to  0;" () (the determined component) and that due
to  0; ()M (the undetermined component that captures self-fullling beliefs): As is clear,
while pre-Volcker, the self-fullling beliefs captured by the undetermined component imply an
increase in ination following a monetary contraction, post-Volcker, they imply a decrease in
ination. Similarly, in Figure 6; we decompose the impulse responses to scal policy shocks
under PMPF in the two time periods into the determined and undetermined components: As
is clear, while pre-Volcker, the self-fullling beliefs captured by the undetermined component
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imply a decrease in ination following a scal contraction, post-Volcker, they imply an increase
in ination.
3.6.2 Variance decomposition
Role of random component of policy We showed above that transmission mechanisms
of monetary and scal policies are substantially di¤erent in the two time-periods. We next
assess how important were the random components in policies in explaining variations in
ination and output. Variance decomposition results, as given in Tables 5 and 6; show that in
both the time-periods and at both the short and long-run, unanticipated shifts in monetary
and scal policies play only a minor role in explaining the dynamics of ination and output.24
For example, for ination, pre-Volcker, monetary and scal policy shocks explain less than
10% of the variation at both horizons. In particular, pre-Volcker, lump-sum tax shocks explain
3:1% of ination variation in the short-run and 1:3% in the long-run. These e¤ects, while
smaller, are roughly the same order of magnitude as those of monetary policy shocks, which
explain 8:1% of ination variation in the short-run and 4:6% in the long-run. Post-Volcker,
while the scal policy shock explains no variation at either horizon because the prevailing
regime is AMPF, the monetary policy shock also is estimated to explain basically no variation
at either horizon.
For output growth, pre-Volcker, monetary policy shocks explain around 1:6% while scal
policy shocks explain around 6:0% of the variation in both the short and long-run. Post-
Volcker, the monetary shock explains around 2:5% of the variation at both horizons while
scal policy shocks explain basically no variation in output growth. Our result that random
variations in monetary policy do not explain much of the uctuations in ination and output
is consistent with the results in the identied VAR literature, for example, Sims and Zha
(2006a). That the same conclusion also holds for random variations in scal policy, given by
unanticipated movements in taxes, is completely new to the literature.
Role of time-varying ination target We next assess the role of time-varying ination
target in explaining ination dynamics, in particular the rise in ination in the pre-Volcker
period. In the recent DSGE literature, a consensus nding has emerged that the long-run
variation in ination is explained mostly by shocks to the ination target in the monetary
reaction function. For example, Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) show that both pre-
and post-Volcker, smoothed values of the ination target shock recovered from estimation
track actual ination remarkably well. In contrast, we nd that pre-Volcker, as opposed to
post-Volcker, variations in the ination target do not explain low-frequency movements in
24We focus on a 4 and 40 quarter horizon in our variance decomposition results.
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ination.
Table 5 clearly shows that while we nd a similar result to Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2010) in the post-Volcker period, where the ination target shock accounts for 81:1% of the
long-run variation in ination, our results are quite di¤erent in the pre-Volcker era, where the
ination target shock explains only 5:5% of the long-run variation in ination. We make this
result also clear in Fig. 7; which plots smoothed ination target shocks recovered from the
estimation of the model in the two time-periods under various policy regime combinations.
While ination target shock tracks ination well under an AMPF regime, this correspondence
weakens substantially under either PMPF or PMAF.
The major reason for this di¤erence is that we explicitly allow for the possibility of inde-
terminacy while estimating our model that features both monetary and scal policy. When
the regime is active monetary and passive scal policy, as is the implicit assumption in Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) for both the time-periods, then changes in ination target do
explain ination in the long-run since monetary policy fully controls ination dynamics. Our
best-tting estimated model in the pre-Volcker features indeterminacy due to passive mone-
tary policy, however. In this case, consider an increase in the ination target. This, through
the central bank reaction function, does tend to decrease the interest rate. A decrease in
interest rate in this model though, as we pointed out above, tends to decrease ination. Thus,
ination target movements do not track actual ination in the long-run. Figure 7 thus makes
clear how the role of time-varying ination target in tracking the low-frequency movement in
ination depends crucially on the monetary and scal policy regime in place.
Ination, output, and debt dynamics We now address which shocks were major drivers
of the dynamics of the three key variables in our model: ination, output, and debt-to-output
ratio. Our main nding is that the primary sources of short and long-run variations in ination,
output, and debt are di¤erent in the two time periods as the propagation mechanism of shocks
varies because of the change in monetary policy stances.
As mentioned above, and shown clearly in Table 5; post-Volcker, low frequency move-
ment in ination is explained mostly by changes in the ination target. The high frequency
movement is mostly explained by mark-up shocks, which is also a standard result in the liter-
ature. In the pre-Volcker period, in contrast, the role of mark-up shocks gets reduced in the
short-run while that of technology and demand shocks increases. Moreover, demand and tech-
nology shocks also explain much of the variation in the long-run along with a non-trivial role
for mark-up shocks. The important role of mark-up shocks at both horizons in the pre-Volcker
period is not surprising given the oil price shocks of the 1970s: Moreover, in the pre-Volcker
period, since the monetary policy regime was passive, demand shocks that would typically be
stabilized under active monetary policy end up inuencing ination dynamics signicantly.
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To emphasize this role of demand shocks, in Figure 8 we report results on the implied coun-
terfactual path of ination in the pre-Volcker period if we simulate our model using smoothed
values of all other shocks except demand shocks. As is clear, the rise of ination in the 1970s
is muted in that case.
For output growth, as shown in Table 6; in both periods, a combination of shocks explain
variation at the two horizons, but the importance of a particular shock is quite di¤erent.
For example, while pre-Volcker, markup shocks are the most important source of variation in
output growth at both horizons (around 33%), post-Volcker, they account for no variation at
either horizon. Thus, according to our estimates, in the post-Volcker period, markup shocks,
which lead to a trade-o¤ between ination and output stabilization under active monetary
policy, a¤ected ination pre-dominantly without a¤ecting output. Finally, government spend-
ing, technology, and demand shocks are important in both the time periods, although the role
of demand shocks is much more substantial in the post-Volcker period. In fact, demand shocks
explain over 50% of the variance in output growth at both horizons in this period.
It is also worth noting that for the pre-Volcker period, as Tables 5  6 make clear, sunspot
shocks introduced due to indeterminacy play a minor role in explaining the dynamics of
ination and output: they are irrelevant for ination dynamics and explain only around
11% of the variation at both horizons for output growth. Thus indeterminacy matters in
our estimated model, not because of a non-trivial role for sunspot uctuations, but mostly
because self-fullling beliefs regarding fundamental shocks signicantly alter the propagation
mechanisms in the model.
Finally, to get insights into the determinants of short- and long-run dynamics of the crucial
scal variable, debt-to-output ratio, it is useful to consider the linearized government budget
constraint which we reproduce below:
b^t =
1

b^t 1 +
b


R^t 1   ^t   b~Y t + b~Y t 1   a^t+ g^t   ^t + s^t:
This equation makes clear that the dynamics of debt-to-output b^t are inuenced by shocks that
a¤ect either returns R^t 1  ^t; output growth b~Y t  b~Y t 1+ a^t; or primary decit g^t  ^t+ s^t: In
both the time-periods, as Table 7 shows, the short-run variation is explained mostly by the
exogenous transfer shock (60:8 and 73:6% respectively). Pre-Volcker, the remaining variation
is explained by mark-up and technology shocks due to their e¤ects on ination, while post-
Volcker, it is explained by the scal policy shock due to its e¤ect on tax revenues.
In the long-run, a combination of shocks are important, but the relative contribution of
these shocks across the two eras are quite di¤erent. In both the periods, government spending
shocks account for an important portion of the variation. Moreover, in the post-Volcker period,
transfer and scal policy shocks are also important drivers of long-run variation in b^t: Finally,
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pre-Volcker, demand, mark-up, and technology shocks account for substantial variation in the
long-run while post-Volcker, the ination target shock explains a non-trivial portion of the
variation. These roles for the shocks arise because, as explained above, they are important
drivers of long-run variation in ination in the respective time-periods.
3.6.3 Role of policy in the rise of ination
With the estimated structural model parameters at hand, we now conduct a counterfactual
exercise. We assess the model implied path of ination, output, and debt-to-output ratio
had the post-Volcker monetary policy regime been in place in the pre-Volcker period. In
particular, with the estimated model parameters and smoothed shocks of the pre-Volcker
period, we simulate our model by making two changes: shutting down the shocks ^t and
"R;t while using the estimate of  from the post-Volcker period.25
First, we nd that the model implied standard deviation of ination is 1:795%, which is
substantially lower than the actual value of 2:722%. Moreover, Figure 9; where we plot the
model implied path of ination together with actual ination, makes clear that under this
monetary policy regime, the rise of ination in the 1970s would have been avoided. Thus, our
counterfactual exercise suggests that a change in the systematic response of monetary policy
would have mattered greatly for ination dynamics in the pre-Volcker era. Second, we nd
that while output growth would not have been quantitatively di¤erent, the debt-to-output
ratio would have been higher in the 1970s. The higher debt-to-output ratio is a result of
lower implied ination, which negates its role in debt stabilization. Figure 9, where we plot
the model implied path of output growth and debt-to-output ratio together with their actual
paths, depicts these results clearly.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed some long-standing questions in macroeconomics using an
estimated DSGE model that has a complete description of both monetary and scal poli-
cies. Our main result is that the monetary and scal policy regime combination in place has
mattered historically for a host of issues: the prevalence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the
transmission mechanism of monetary and scal policy, and the major sources of variation in
output, ination, and government debt. That is, we nd the nature of the systematic response
25Note here that we only change  and in particular, keep the scal parameters the same as the estimated
values. Moreover, while we shut down ^t and "R;t; that does not inuence our results. In other words, under
PMPF in the pre-Volcker regime, ination dynamics with and without these shocks are virtually identical, as
our earlier variance decomposition results make clear.
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of policy to the state of the economy to be paramount in the propagation mechanism of both
policy and non-policy shocks.
In future work, we plan to conduct several robustness exercises and also extend our method-
ology. Given Sims and Zha (2006b)s ndings using an identied VAR that including a mon-
etary aggregate in the monetary policy rule a¤ects inference regarding indeterminacy in the
pre-Volcker period, we want to assess if this alteration to the monetary policy rule inuences
our model comparison results. Moreover, we plan to make our scal policy specication richer
by allowing for countercyclical government spending, as emphasized recently by Cúrdia and
Reis (2011).
More generally, it will be interesting to extend our methodology on two fronts. First, we
can allow for time-varying volatility of shocks in our estimated DSGE model, along the lines of
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Second, extending our sub-sample analysis, we can estimate
a DSGE model with recurring regime switching in both monetary and scal policies, using
the methodology provided in Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the pre-Volcker period
Note: Figure plots pointwise posterior means (solid lines) and 90-percent probability intervals (dashed
lines) for impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to "R;t. Row (a) presents results of the PMAF
regime, pre-Volcker, and row (b) presents results of the PMPF regime, pre-Volcker. The unit of the impulse
responses is percentage deviations from the steady state for output and percentage point deviations from the
steady state for the rest of the variables.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the post-Volcker period
Note: Figure plots pointwise posterior means (solid lines) and 90-percent probability intervals (dashed
lines) for impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to "R;t. Row (a) presents results of the AMPF
regime, post-Volcker, and row (b) presents results of the PMPF regime, post-Volcker. The unit of the impulse
responses is percentage deviations from the steady state for output and percentage point deviations from the
steady state for the rest of the variables.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to scal policy shocks in the pre-Volcker period
Note: Figure plots pointwise posterior means (solid lines) and 90-percent probability intervals (dashed
lines) for impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to ";t. Row (a) presents results of the PMAF
regime, pre-Volcker, and row (b) presents results of the PMPF regime, pre-Volcker. The unit of the impulse
responses is percentage deviations from the steady state for output and percentage point deviations from the
steady state for the rest of the variables.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to scal policy shocks in the post-Volcker period
Note: Figure plots pointwise posterior means (solid lines) and 90-percent probability intervals (dashed
lines) for impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to ";t. Row (a) presents results of the AMPF
regime, post-Volcker, and row (b) presents results of the PMPF regime, post-Volcker. The unit of the impulse
responses is percentage deviations from the steady state for output and percentage point deviations from the
steady state for the rest of the variables.
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Figure 5: Decomposition of the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks
Note: Figure presents three impulse responses of each variable to one standard deviation shock to "R;t:
1) impulse responses due to the determined part of initial impact of monetary policy shock, 2) impulse
responses due to the undetermined part of initial impact of monetary policy shock, and 3) the combined
impulse responses of 1) and 2). Row (a) presents the impulse responses under PMPF, pre-Volcker and row
(b) presents the impulse responses under PMPF, post-Volcker. The impulse responses were computed at the
posterior mode.
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the impulse responses to scal policy shocks
Note: Figure presents three impulse responses of each variable to one standard deviation shock to ";t: 1)
impulse responses due to the determined part of initial impact of scal policy shock, 2) impulse responses due
to the undetermined part of initial impact of scal policy shock, and 3) the combined impulse responses of 1)
and 2). Row (a) presents the impulse responses under PMPF, pre-Volcker and row (b) presents the impulse
responses under PMPF, post-Volcker. The impulse responses were computed at the posterior mode.
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Figure 7: Smoothed ination target and ination
Note: Figure presents actual ination and the point-wise mean of the smoothed values of the ination
target for the three policy regimes for both the pre- and the post-Volcker periods.
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Figure 8: Counterfactual path of ination with no preference shocks
Note: Figure presents actual and counterfactual path of ination with the preference shock shut down in
the pre-Volcker period under PMPF. The presented counterfactual paths are point-wise mean of counterfactual
paths.
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Figure 8: Counterfactual path of output growth, ination, and debt-to-output ratio
Note: Figure presents actual and counterfactual path of the three variables. The distribution of counter-
factual paths was rst computed by changing the posterior draws of  in the PMPF model pre-Volcker so that
 is set to 1.2991, the posterior mean of  in the AMPF model post-Volcker. The presented counterfactual
paths are point-wise mean of these counterfactual paths. The monetary policy shock and the ination target
shock were shut down.
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Table 1: Prior distribution of structural parameters
Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
Distribution Mean St. Dev. [5th, 95th] Mean St. Dev. [5th, 95th]
 Gamma 0.5 0.2 [0.222, 0.868]
Y Gamma 0.12 0.05 [0.051, 0.212]
 b Gamma 0.05 0.04 [0.006, 0.129]
 Y Normal 0.4 0.3 [-0.094, 0.894]
 g Normal 0.7 0.3 [0.207, 1.194]
 Beta 0.5 0.1 [0.335, 0.665]
 Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
 Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
g Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
d Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
a Beta 0.4 0.2 [0.079, 0.722]
u Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931] Same as pre-Volcker
s Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
R Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
 Beta 0.6 0.2 [0.288, 0.931]
g Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
d Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
a Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
u Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
s Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
R Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
 Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0.166, 1.237]
 Inv. Gamma 0.06 0.03 [0.032, 0.112]
b Inv. Gamma 0.4 0.2 [0.221, 0.746]
100 (a  1) Normal 0.48 0.1 [0.316, 0.645] 0.57 0.1 [0.406, 0.735]
100 (   1) Gamma 1.1 0.1 [0.941, 1.270] 0.64 0.1 [0.485, 0.813]
100( 1   1) Gamma 0.25 0.1 [0.111, 0.434] 0.25 0.1 [0.111, 0.434]
100b Gamma 36 2 [32.775, 39.352] 48 2 [44.758, 51.336]
100 Gamma 25 2 [21.804, 28.378] 25 2 [21.804, 28.378]
100g Gamma 25 2 [21.804, 28.378] 21 2 [17.822, 24.394]
Additional parameters under indeterminacy
 Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 [0. 166, 1.237]
Mg Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
Md Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
Ma Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
Mu Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645] Same as pre-Volcker
Ms Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
MR Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
M Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
M Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
Mb Normal 0 1 [-1.645, 1.645]
Note: The column labeled [5th, 9tth] presents the 5th and 95th percentiles. The parameters Mg , Md ;    ,
Mb are entries of M in (2).
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Table 2: Prior distribution of monetary and scal policy parameters
Parameters Policy Mean St. Dev. [5th, 95th]
 Active Monetary 1.500 0.200 [ 1.189, 1.811]
Passive Monetary 0.497 0.200 [ 0.185, 0.811]
 b Active Fiscal -0.047 0.040 [-0.102, 0.003]
Passive Fiscal 0.053 0.040 [ 0.003, 0.107]
Note: The last column presents the 5th and 95th percentiles. The prior distribution of  and  b was obtained
based on a simulation from the prior distribution of the structural parameters. Since the prior distribution of
those parameters that determine the boundary condition of active and passive policy is identical pre-Volcker
and post-Volcker,  and  b also have the same prior distribution across the subsamples.
Table 3: Comparison of the marginal likelihood of alternate regimes
Determinacy Indeterminacy
AMPF PMAF PMPF
Pre-Volcker -542.0 -539.8 -522.1
Post-Volcker -554.4 -564.5 -569.8
Note: Table reports log marginal likelihoods that are computed using the harmonic mean estimator proposed
by John F. Geweke (1999).
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Table 4: Posterior distribution of structural parameters
Pre-Volcker (PMPF) Post-Volcker (AMPF)
Mean [5th, 95th] Mean [5th, 95th]
 0.799 [0.631, 0.986] 0.454 [0.170, 0.719]
 0.188 [0.000, 0.354] 1.299 [0.922, 1.680]
Y 0.296 [0.195, 0.399] 0.447 [0.304, 0.587]
 b 0.092 [0.038, 0.145] 0.097 [0.022, 0.166]
 b 0.094 [0.040, 0.146] 0.099 [0.024, 0.168]
 Y 0.748 [0.512, 0.984] 0.738 [0.317, 1.163]
 g 0.448 [0.120, 0.772] 0.232 [-0.323, 0.770]
 0.696 [0.580, 0.818] 0.838 [0.775, 0.899]
 0.217 [0.062, 0.367] 0.722 [0.597, 0.861]
 0.342 [0.060, 0.616] 0.139 [0.028, 0.246]
g 0.966 [0.941, 0.993] 0.986 [0.976, 0.997]
d 0.862 [0.762, 0.966] 0.861 [0.777, 0.947]
a 0.300 [0.028, 0.562] 0.527 [0.234, 0.820]
u 0.370 [0.076, 0.648] 0.122 [0.024, 0.217]
s 0.745 [0.614, 0.880] 0.735 [0.624, 0.845]
R 0.652 [0.519, 0.782] 0.797 [0.738, 0.857]
 0.436 [0.230, 0.641] 0.867 [0.781, 0.955]
g 0.227 [0.196, 0.257] 0.164 [0.145, 0.183]
d 0.278 [0.176, 0.379] 0.489 [0.199, 0.803]
a 0.619 [0.251, 0.942] 0.404 [0.165, 0.638]
u 0.200 [0.150, 0.250 0.141 [0.120, 0.163]
s 1.018 [0.880, 1.151] 1.361 [1.201, 1.516]
R 0.167 [0.136, 0.197] 0.108 [0.093, 0.123]
 0.597 [0.481, 0.716] 0.582 [0.507, 0.656]
 0.060 [0.026, 0.093] 0.037 [0.024, 0.050]
b 0.348 [0.170, 0.525] 0.400 [0.173, 0.618]
100 (a  1) 0.401 [0.302, 0.502] 0.589 [0.488, 0.690]
100 (   1) 1.052 [0.897, 1.202] 0.644 [0.481, 0.801]
100( 1   1) 0.160 [0.057, 0.258] 0.236 [0.099, 0.371]
100b 36.253 [33.064, 39.455] 48.235 [44.980, 51.433]
100 25.051 [24.119, 25.970] 24.524 [23.534, 25.516]
100g 24.129 [23.206, 25.063] 21.787 [20.775, 22.778]
Additional parameters under indeterminacy
 0.215 [0.129, 0.298]
Mg 0.198 [-0.201, 0.604]
Md -0.391 [-1.124, 0.341]
Ma 0.110 [-0.200, 0.441]
Mu 0.358 [-0.191, 0.903]
Ms -0.066 [-0.173, 0.039]
MR -0.219 [-0.826, 0.380]
M 0.244 [0.016, 0.475]
M 0.037 [-1.474, 1.542]
Mb 0.010 [-0.659, 0.680]
Note: The column labeled [5th, 95th] presents the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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Table 5: Variance decompositions of ination
Pre-Volcker (PMPF) Post-Volcker (AMPF)
Shocks Short-Run (4 Q) Long-Run (40 Q) Short-Run (4 Q) Long-Run (40 Q)
Govt. spending 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000
"g;t [0.000, 0.021] [0.000, 0.008] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Preference 0.187 0.422 0.052 0.016
"d;t [0.039, 0.388] [0.112, 0.868] [0.008, 0.131] [0.001, 0.052]
Technology 0.410 0.177 0.000 0.000
"a;t [0.168, 0.641] [0.015, 0.405] [0.000, 0.001] [0.000, 0.000]
Mark-up 0.184 0.247 0.726 0.173
"u;t [0.070, 0.352] [0.033, 0.560] [0.543, 0.883] [0.022, 0.430]
Transfer 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.000
"s;t [0.000, 0.040] [0.000, 0.020] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Monetary policy 0.081 0.046 0.001 0.000
"R;t [0.010, 0.205] [0.002, 0.139] [0.000, 0.004] [0.000, 0.001]
Tax revenues 0.031 0.013 0.000 0.000
";t [0.001, 0.088] [0.000, 0.045] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Ination target 0.005 0.055 0.221 0.811
";t [0.000, 0.023] [0.000, 0.245] [0.094, 0.379] [0.545, 0.973]
Debt target 0.019 0.008 0.000 0.000
"b;t [0.000, 0.071] [0.000, 0.033] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Sunspot 0.066 0.027 0 0
";t [0.0180, 0.145] [0.002, 0.072] - -
Note: Means and [5th, 95th] posterior percentiles.
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Table 6: Variance decompositions of output growth
Pre-Volcker (PMPF) Post-Volcker (AMPF)
Shocks Short-Run (4 Q) Long-Run (40 Q) Short-Run (4 Q) Long-Run (40 Q)
Govt. spending 0.147 0.143 0.126 0.121
"g;t [0.0604, 0.251] [0.058, 0.244] [0.088, 0.172] [0.084 , 0.165 ]
Preference 0.165 0.165 0.573 0.575
"d;t [0.0176, 0.352] [0.0191, 0.3505] [0.411, 0.715] [0.413, 0.715]
Technology 0.100 0.109 0.256 0.259
"a;t [0.0274, 0.251] [0.0351, 0.254] [0.120, 0.423] [0.126, 0.426]
Mark-up 0.329 0.330 0.004 0.005
"u;t [0.1490, 0.532] [0.1516, 0.5325] [0.001, 0.010] [0.001, 0.010]
Transfer 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000
"s;t [0.000, 0.066] [0.000, 0.0649] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Monetary policy 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.026
"R;t [0.005, 0.042] [0.005, 0.042] [0.009, 0.050] [0.010, 0.050]
Tax revenues 0.062 0.060 0.000 0.000
";t [0.002, 0.170] [0.002, 0.166] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Ination target 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.015
";t [0.000, 0.031] [0.000, 0.030] [0.006, 0.032] [0.005, 0.031]
Debt target 0.036 0.035 0.000 0.000
"b;t [0.000, 0.132] [0.000, 0.129] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Sunspot 0.117 0.114 0 0
";t [0.041, 0.235] [0.041, 0.230] - -
Note: Means and [5th, 95th] posterior percentiles.
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Table 7: Variance decompositions of debt-to-output ratio
Pre-Volcker (PMPF) Post-Volcker (AMPF)
Shocks Short-Run (4 Q) Long-Run (40 Q) Short-Run (4 Q) Long-Run (40 Q)
Govt. spending 0.016 0.214 0.017 0.416
"g;t [0.000, 0.045] [0.006, 0.614] [0.010, 0.027 ] [0.006, 0.874 ]
Preference 0.014 0.197 0.025 0.042
"d;t [0.000, 0.052] [0.030, 0.450] [0.002, 0.075] [0.000, 0.185]
Technology 0.129 0.160 0.006 0.002
"a;t [0.010, 0.301] [0.014, 0.388] [0.002, 0.013] [0.000, 0.007]
Mark-up 0.126 0.210 0.000 0.001
"u;t [0.041, 0.244] [0.041, 0.465] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.002]
Transfer 0.608 0.047 0.736 0.177
"s;t [0.418, 0.768] [0.000, 0.239] [0.636, 0.825] [0.001, 0.611]
Monetary policy 0.005 0.035 0.003 0.002
"R;t [0.000, 0.021] [0.001, 0.112] [0.001, 0.007] [0.000, 0.006]
Tax revenues 0.0565 0.011 0.210 0.170
";t [0.002, 0.183] [0.000, 0.041] [0.112, 0.316] [0.000, 0.690]
Ination target 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.103
";t [0.000, 0.009] [0.000, 0.007] [0.001, 0.006] [0.003, 0.323]
Debt target 0.011 0.098 0.000 0.090
"b;t [0.000, 0.041] [0.001, 0.360] [0.000, 0.000] [0.002, 0.306]
Sunspot 0.033 0.026 0 0
";t [0.008, 0.078] [0.002, 0.071] - -
Note: Means and [5th, 95th] posterior percentiles.
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Appendix
A System of equilibrium conditions
The technology process At induces a common trend in output Yt, consumption Ct; real wage
~Wt(i)
Pt
, government purchases Gt, government debt Bt=Pt, tax revenues Tt, and transfers St.
Since we solve the model through a local approximation of its dynamics around a steady state,
we rst detrend the variables as
~Yt  Yt
At
; ~Ct  Ct
At
; and
~Wt(i)
Pt
 Wt(i)
PtAt
:
Note that the scal variables, bt = Bt=PtYt, gt = Gt=Yt, t = Tt=Yt, and st = St=Yt are already
stationary. We then rewrite the equilibrium conditions in terms of the detrended variables,
compute the non-stochastic steady state, and then take a rst-order approximation around
the steady state. In the ensuing subsections, we present the equilibrium conditions in terms
of the detrended variables and their rst order approximations.
A.1 Equilibrium conditions in terms of detrended variables
 Consumption Euler equation:
Et
24 1
t+1

~Ct    ~Ct 1a 1t


~Ct+1    ~Cta 1t+1
 t+1
t
1
at+1
35 = 1
Rt
:
 Labor supply:  
Hjt
'  ~Ct    ~Ct 1a 1t  = ~Wt(j)Pt :
 Production function:
~Yt(i) = Ht(i)
 Demand function:
~Yt(i) = [~pt(i)]
 t ~Yt; where ~pt(i) =
Pt(i)
Pt
:
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 Firmsoptimality condition:
Et
1X
k=0
()k

~Ct    ~Ct 1a 1t

t+k
~Ct+k    ~Ct+k 1a 1t+k

t
~Yt+k(i)
"
~pt(i)Xt;kQk
s=1 t+s
 

t
t   1
 ~Wt+k(j)
Pt+k
#
= 0:
 Dixit-Stiglitz price aggregator:
1 =
"
(1  ) ~p1 tt + 


t
t 1

1 t# 11 t
:
 Government budget constraint:
bt = Rt 1bt 1
1
t
~Yt 1
~Yt
1
at
+ gt   t + st:
 Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r 24 t
t
  ~Yt
~Y t
!Y 351 r e"r;t :
 Fiscal policy rule:
t

=
t 1

 24bt 1
bt 1
 ~ b  ~Yt
~Y t
! ~ Y 
gt
g
 ~ g351  e~";t :
 Resource constraint:
~Yt = ~Ct + gt ~Yt:
A.2 First order approximation
We here present rst-order approximation of the equations that are necessary to determine
equilibrium dynamics of the observables.
 Consumption Euler equation:
b~Ct = a
a+ 
Et
b~Ct+1+ 
a+ 
b~Ct 1 a  
a+ 

R^t   Et^t+1

+
a
a+ 
Eta^t+1  
a+ 
a^t+
a  
a+ 
d^t;
where d^t  (1  ) ^t.
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 NK Phillips curve:
^t =

1 + 
Et^t+1 +

1 + 
^t 1
+
(1  ) (1  )
 (1 + ') (1 + )

'+
a
a  
b~Y t   b~Y t  a  
b~Y t 1   b~Y t 1+ but;
where u^t    (1 )(1 )(1+')(1+) 1 1 ^t can be interpreted as cost-push shocks.
 Monetary policy rule:
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)

 (^t   ^t ) + Y
b~Y t   b~Y t+ "R;t:
 Fiscal policy rule:
^t =  ^t 1 + (1   )

 b

b^t 1   b^t 1

+  Y
b~Y t   b~Y t+  gg^t+ ";t;
where  b;  Y and  g are respectively scaled counterparts of ~ b, ~ Y and ~ g:
 b  b
~ b;  Y   ~ Y ,  g  
g
~ g,
and ";t is given as:
";t   ~";t  i:i:d. N
 
0; 2

:
 Government budget constraint:
b^t = 
 1b^t 1 +  1b

R^t 1   ^t   b~Y t + b~Y t 1   a^t+ g^t   ^t + s^t
 Resource constraint: b~Y t = b~Ct + 1
1  g g^t
 Natural level of output:
b~Y t = ' (a  ) + a b~Y t 1 + a[' (a  ) + a] (1  g) g^t   [' (a  ) + a] (1  g) g^t 1
  
' (a  ) + aa^t:
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 AR(1) processes for exogenous shocks:
g^t = gg^t 1 + "g;t;
d^t = dd^t 1 + "d;t;
a^t = aa^t 1 + "a;t;but = ubut 1 + "u;t;bst = sbst 1 + "s;t;
^t = ^

t 1 + ";t;
b^t = bb^

t 1 + "b;t:
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B Data description
We use the following denitions for our data variables: per capita output = (personal con-
sumption of nondurable+personal consumption of services+government consumption) / civil-
ian noninstitutional population; annualized ination = 400 log(GDP deator); annualized
interest rates = the quarterly average of daily e¤ective federal funds rates; tax revenues =
current tax receipts + contributions for government social insurance; government debt =
market value of privately held gross federal debt; and government purchases = government
consumption. Note that we use a single price level, GDP deator, for all the model variables
(e.g. output, government debt, tax revenues, and government purchases).
The e¤ective federal funds rate and civilian noninstitutional population data were obtained
from the FRED database of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The market value of privately
held gross federal debt series was obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. All the other
data were taken from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables.
C Solution method under indeterminacy
This section describes the solution method of a linear rational expectations (LRE) model under
indeterminacy proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Then we discuss an identication
problem in their method and how to address the problem.
C.1 Sims (2002)
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) starts with the following canonical form of LRE models by Sims
(2002)
 0zt =  1zt 1 + 	"t + t; (3)
where zt is an n  1 vector of model variables, "t is an l  1 vector of fundamental shocks,
and t is a k  1 vector of expectational errors, satisfyingEtt+1 = 0. We consider a case in
which the exogenous fundamental shock process "t is serially uncorrelated.26 Using the QZ
(generalized Schur) decomposition, the coe¢ cient matrices  0 and  1 can be decomposed as
 0 = Q
0Z 0,  1 = Q0
Z 0 where  and 
 are upper triangular and Q and Z are unitary:
QQ0 = Q0Q = I and ZZ 0 = Z 0Z = I. Let wt = Z 0zt and multiply both sides of Equation (3)
26A model with a serially correlated shock process can always be rewritten so that the model has a serially
uncorrelated shock process by augmenting yt to include the original shock process.
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by Q to obtain"
11 12
0 22
#"
w1;t
w2;t
#
=
"

11 
12
0 
22
#"
w1;t 1
w2;t 1
#
+
"
Q1
Q2
#
(	"t + t) ;
where the generalized eigenvalues of the QZ decomposition (the ratios of diagonal elements
of 
 and ) are ordered such that explosive eigenvalues (ones that do not meet the growth
condition for zt) are in the lower right corner and , 
 and Q are partitioned accordingly.
Now suppose that there are m unstable generalized eigenvalues (m  n). That is, Q2 is an
m n matrix. When the explosive components (decoupled from the rst stable components)
are solved forward, it is a function of the current and future values of "t and t. For a stable
solution to Equation (3) to exist, this forward solution of the unstable part should be constant
and therefore it should hold that
Q2 (	"t + t) = 0: (4)
Since "t is exogenous, we need t to be determined so that the condition (4) is satised (for
every possible path of "t). The condition (4) is satised when the column space spanned by
Q2	 be contained by the column space spanned by Q2.
C.2 Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
A necessary and su¢ cient condition that a solution to (3) be unique is that the row space
spanned by Q1 be contained by the row space spanned by Q2. Then, the expectational
error for the stable part is expressed as a function of the fundamental shock. The condition
is met when there exists a conformable matrix  such that
Q1 = Q2: (5)
When the condition (4) is satised but (5) is not, t is not completely pinned down by "t.
There always exists a singular value decomposition (SVD) of Q2 as
Q2| {z }
mk
=
"
U1|{z}
mr
U2|{z}
m(k r)
#264 D11|{z}rr 0
0 0
375
26664
V 01|{z}
rk
V 02|{z}
(k r)k
37775 ; (6)
whereD11 is a diagonal matrix with nonzero singular values on its diagonal and U =
h
U1 U2
i
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and V =
h
V1 V2
i
are unitary. Suppose that there are r  m nonzero singular values. Then
the m explosive components of zt generate only r restrictions for t. When r = m, we have
enough restrictions to pin down the expectations of the model and there exists a unique
solution. Otherwise, there exist multiple equilibria.
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) introduce sunspot shocks and assume that the undetermined
dimensions of t are a¤ected by the sunspot shocks additively. Let
t = A1"t + A2

t ;
where t is a p 1 vector of sunspot shocks with Ett+1 = 0, A1 is a k  l matrix and A2 is
a k p matrix. Then A1 and A2 characterize the full set of solutions to the model (3). Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) show that the full set of solutions are given as
t =
  V1D 111 U 01Q2	 + V2M1 "t + V2M2t ; (7)
where M1 is a (k   r) l matrix and M2 is a (k   r) p matrix. When there exists a unique
solution or r = k, V2 = 0 and and the unique solution is not a¤ected by the sunspot shock
t . When there exist multiple solutions or r < k, 

t a¤ects zt through their inuence on t
and also the impact of "t on t changes. The new parameters M1 and M2 are not determined
by the structural parameters and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) propose to treat them as
additional parameters. SinceM2 is not identied in the model, only (k   r) dimensions of the
sunspot shocks matter. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) reparameterize t = M2

t . Putting the
solution of the expectational error t, (7), back to the model (3), a solution of the model can
be written as
zt =  

1zt 1 +
 
 0;" +  

0;M

"t +  

0;t: (8)
C.3 Identication problem
An identication problem arises because V2, the left singular vectors of a SVD of Q2 in
(6), corresponds to zero singular values and thus is not identied. Because of this problem,
 0; in (8) is not well identied. This appears to cause numerical instability in their solution
method. For example, small changes in parameter values can easily lead to a large change in
the likelihood of a LRE model under indeterminacy.
Since in our model the degree of indeterminacy is at most one,  0; is simply a vector.
We identify  0; by normalizing its rst entry to its norm. With this normalization, posterior
density maximization and simulation of our model is stable and works well. The normalization
would a¤ect the posterior distribution of the entries of the matrix M in (8). However, those
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parameters in M do not have behavioral interpretations. What matters is the additional
channel for the propagation of the fundamental shocks,  0;M , whose posterior distribution is
not a¤ected by the normalization if the prior distribution for the entries ofM is at. Although
our baseline prior for the entries ofM is not completely at, it is very di¤use and the e¤ect of
the normalization is not signicant. We tried di¤erent specications for the prior distribution
for the entries of M , including a uniform prior distribution over ( 5; 5) and our results were
robust to these variations. The same argument applies to t.
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